

Message Text

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FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8479

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 4 AMMAN 3615

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, JO

SUBJECT: KING HUSSEIN'S INTERVIEW WITH NEWSWEEK'S DE BOURCHGRAVE
ON SOVIET MISSILE NEGOTIATIONS AND OTHER ISSUES

REF: AMMAN 3614

1. FOR SUMMARY SEE REFTEL.

FOLLOWING IS FULL TEXT OF FINAL VERSION OF
INTERVIEW:

BEGIN TEXT: (INTERVIEW WITH H.M. KING HUSSEIN,
AMMAN, JULY 6, 1976.)

1) BORCHGRAVE -- YOU HAVE BEEN NEGOTIATING A SAM
ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENSE SYSTEM WITH THE SOVIETS AS A
POSSIBLE SUBSTITUTE FOR THE U.S. HAWK SYSTEM WHICH IS PROVING
MUCH COSTLIER THAN ORIGINALLY ANTICIPATED. THE FACT
THAT THIS WAS NOT MENTIONED IN THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE AT
THE END OF YOUR SOVIET VISIT HAS LED SOME OBSERVERS
TO CONCLUDE THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE FAILED.

KING HUSSEIN -- NOT AT ALL. QUITE THE CONTRARY.
THE NEGOTIATIONS WERE SUCCESSFUL AND WE CAME BACK WITH
A VERY ATTRACTIVE OFFER WHICH WOULD GIVE US A COMPARABLE
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YET MORE FLEXIBLY AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM THAN THE HAWK.

EVEN THOUGH THE FINANCIAL TERMS OFFERED ARE GENEROUS, IN BEING LESS COSTLY THAN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM'S AS IT WAS OFFERED PRIOR TO OUR NEGOTIATING WITH THE SOVIETS, THE FACT REMAINS THAT THE SOVIET DEAL IS OFFERED ON A CASH ON DELIVERY BASIS. OUR PROBLEM THEN IS STILL THE FINANCIAL ONE WHICH WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO RESOLVE.

2) QUESTION -- HOW DO YOU EXPLAIN THE IRONY OF PRO-WESTERN JORDAN, ERSTWHILE FAITHFUL ALLY OF THE U.S., TURNING TO THE SOVIET UNION FOR YOUR MOST ESSENTIAL ASPECT OF SELF-DEFENSE?

ANSWER -- OUR INABILITY TO SECURE OUR NEEDS IN AN ADEQUATE FASHION FROM OUR TRADITIONAL SOURCES OF SUPPLY FORCED US TO LOOK ESLEWHERE FOR OUR LEGITIMATE SELF-DEFENSE. BUT SOVIET-SUPPLIED WEAPONS WILL IN NO WAY DIFFER FROM U.S. OR EUROPEAN-SUPPLIED ARMAMENTS. ONCE THEY ARE IN OUR HANDS, THEY AUTOMATICALLY BECOME JORDANIAN AND ARAB REGARDLESS OF COURSE.

3) QUESTION -- WHEN DID YOUR PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. BEGIN TO CHANGE AND WHO DO YOU FEEL IS RESPONSIBLE FOR YOUR OWN DISENCHANTMENT?

ANSWER -- WE BEGAN TO FEEL LET DOWN BY THE U.S. IN THE SUMMER OF 1974 WHEN YOUR ADMINISTRATION DECIDED, AFTER THE SYRIAN-ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT, TO FOLLOW ISRAELI ADVICE AND IGNORE THE WEST BANK WHILE SHIFTING THE U.S. DIPLOMATIC EFFORT BACK TO SINAI AND A SECOND DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT WITH EGYPT. THIS LED US TO ACCEPT THE RABAT SUMMIT DECISIONS ON THE ARAB SIDE AND A YEAR LATER WE SAW SINAI II, WHICH, IN TURN, RESULTED IN SERIOUS DIVISIONS IN ARAB RANKS AND WRECKED THE DIPLOMATIC PROCESS FOR AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT.

THE U.S., LET'S NOT FORGET, HAS ALSO HELPED CREATE A TREMENDOUS IMBALANCE BETWEEN ISRAEL ON THE ONE HAND, AND THE ARAB CONFRONTATION STATES, PARTICULARLY SYRIA AND JORDAN, ON THE OTHER. WITH AMERICA'S GENEROUS MILITARY ASSISTANCE OF \$2.4 BILLION A YEAR TO ISRAEL, NOT TO MENTION ECONOMIC AND OTHER AID (NOT THAT WE ARE UNGRATEFUL) IT IS ALL TOO OBVIOUS TO US THAT WHEN IT

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COMES TO A BALANCE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND JORDAN, WE DON'T SEEM TO COUNT FOR MUCH IN WASHINGTON'S EYES. OUR DISAPPOINTMENT GREW WITH OUR UNFORTUNATE EXPERIENCE OVER THE HAWK MATTER. IN RECENT YEARS, THE U.S. HAS ACTED OR REACTED AS IF IT WERE FAR MORE INTERESTED IN PLACATING FOES THAN IN CONCILIATING FRIENDS. THESE TRENDS, COUPLED WITH RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, HAVE CONVINCED US THAT WE SHOULD DIVERSIFY AS MUCH AS

POSSIBLE OUR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN OUR OWN
NATIONAL INTEREST.

4) QUESTION -- WAS THE LENGTH OF YOUR STAY IN
THE SOVIET UNION -- 12 DAYS -- DESIGNED TO EMPHASIZE
TO THE U.S. A NEW RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION?

ANSWER -- NO. IN FACT, WE HAVE BEEN TO THE U.S.
ALMOST YEARLY BUT HAD ONLY VISITED RUSSIA ONCE AND
THEN ONLY FOR THREE DAYS IN THE WAKE OF THE DISASTER
THAT BEFELL THE ARAB WORLD IN 1967. WE HAD MUCH TO
TALK ABOUT WITH OUR SOVIET FREINDS AND IT WAS ALL
DONE IN A VERY FRANK AND CONSTRUCTIVE WAY. WE LOOKED
AT VARIOUS POSSIBILITIES FOR MUTUAL COOPERATION IN
DIFFERENT SPHERES IN THE FUTURE AND WE ALSO WNATED TO
SEE THE SOVIET UNION. WE ARE MOST GRATIFIED BY THE
RESULTS.

5) QUESTIN -- WOULDN'T A SAM AGREEMENT WITH THE
SOVIETS JEOPARDIZE FURTHER U.S. MILITARY AND ECONOMIC
AID AS SOME OF OUR CONGRESSMEN ARE BOUND TO ARGUE THAT
THE U.S., IN EFFECT, WILL BE HELPING TO PAY FOR
JORDAN'S SOVIET WEAPONS?

ANSWER -- WE DIDN'T SHOP FOR A SOVIET ALTERNATIVE
UNTIL WE HAD SPENT YEARS TRYING TO OBTAIN AN ADEQUATE
SYSTEM FROM THE U.S. -- ALL TO NO AVAIL SO FAR. THE
ISRAELI LOBBY ON CAPITOL HILL IS FAR MORE POWERFUL THAN
THE AMERICAN PUBLIC SEEMS TO REALIZE. THE U.S. HAS
NO MONOPOLY ON AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS AND NO RIGHT TO
IMPOSE ON US WHAT WE CAN OR CANNOT HAVE. AND THE
SAME PRINCIPLE WILL APPLY SHOULD WE BUY SOVIET. WE
HAVE NEVER EVEN CONSIDERED THE POSSIBLITY OF U.S.
ASSISTANCE FOR SOVIET WEAPONS. THE U.S. WOULD NOT
PARTICIPATE IN THE FINANCING, EVEN INDIRECTLY. I
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DOUBT VERY SERIOUSLY THAT ANY HAVE THE RIGHT THEN TO
CONSIDER ARAB FINANCIAL HELP TO JORDAN AS BEING
AMERICAN AND REFUSE TO ACCEPT SUCH AN INFERNECE.

6) QUESTION -- WON'T A SOVIET SAM DEAL HARDEN
STILL FURTHER ISRAEL'S REFUSAL TO GIVE UP THE WEST
BANK AS ISRAELI LEADERS ARGUE THAT SOVIET HARDWARE
ON THE EAST BANK, HOWEVER MUCH CONTROLLED BY JORDAN,
WILL MAKE CONTINUED ISRAELI OCCUPATION IMPERATIVE?

ANSWER -- SINCE THEY HAVE SHOWN NO INTENTION OF
MOVING OFF THE WEST BANK WHILE JORDAN WAS SUPPLIED WITH
U.S. WEAPONS, I DON'T SEE HOW THEIR POSITION CAN
HARDEN STILL FURTHER WITH SOVIET ANTI-AIRCRAFT
WEAPONS. IN FACT, MANY OF US BELIEVE THAT IF JORDAN
WERE STRONGER THAN IT IS, WHICH IT WOULD BE WITH

ADEQUATE DEFENSE OF OUR SKIES, THIS WOULD HELP MAKE
THE ISRAELIS LESS INTRANSIGENT.

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FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8480

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 4 AMMAN 3615

LIMDIS

7) QUESTION -- HOW MUCH LESS COSTLY WILL SAMS
BE THAN HAWKS?

ANSWER -- AS THINGS STOOD, ABOUT FORTY PER CENT
LESS FOR A COMPARABLE, COMPATIBLE SYSTEM.

8) QUESTION -- CAN SAMS BE POSITIONED WHEREVER
YOU JUDGE NECESSARY -- RATHER THAN IN IMMOVABLE SITES
DETERMINED BY THE U.S. AS CONGRESS INSISTED BY THE
CASE FOR HAWKS?

ANSWER -- WE NEVER ACCEPTED ANY LIMITATION ON
DEPLOYMENT OF HAWKS. I THINK IT'S FAIR TO
SAY, HOWEVER, THAT SAMS ARE MORE MOBILE.

9) QUESTION -- HOW LONG WILL A SAM SYSTEM TAKE
TO INSTALL?

ANSWER -- ABOUT THE SAME TIME AS A HAWK ONE--
ABOUT THREE YEARS BEFORE IT IS FULLY OPERATIONAL.

10) QUESTION -- HOW MANY SOVIET TECHNICIANS
WILL THE CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION OF THE SYSTEM REQUIRE?

ANSWER -- THE BASIC UNDERSTANDING WE HAVE WITH
THE SOVIETS IS THAT WE WOULD SEND OUR CREWS TO RUSSIA

FOR TRAINING AND THAT WE WOULD OPERATE THE SYSTEM ON
OUR OWN. IT WAS THE SAME UNDERSTANDING WITH THE
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U.S. BEFORE THE HAWK DEAL COLLAPSED AND ON ALL
EQUIPMENT WE PREVIOUSLY ACQUIRED.

11) QUESTION -- WHO WILL PAY FOR THE SYSTEM?
ANSWER -- THAT'S PRECISELY OUR PROBLEM AND
WHAT WE'RE LOOKING AT NOW.

12) QUESTION -- YOU RECENTLY ASKED LIBYA TO
RESUME RETROACTIVELY THE KHARTOUM PAYMENTS OF \$30
MILLION A YEAR TO JORDAN, AGREED AFTER THE ARAB DEFEAT
IN 1967 AND INTERRUPTED WHEN THE PLO WAS EXPELLED
AFTER THE 1970 UPRISINGS. THIS WOULD COME TO ABOUT
\$180 MILLION. WOULD THIS BE FOR THE SAME PURCHASE?

ANSWER -- WE'VE HAD CONTACTS WITH THE LIBYAN
GOVERNMENT ABOUT THIS SINCE WE RESUMED DIPLOMATIC
RELATIONS AFTER MY LAST VISIT TO THE U.S. IF
LIBYA IS WILLING TO MEET ITS COMMITMENTS AND HELP
US BUY WHAT WE SERIOUSLY NEED TO REMAIN A CONFRONTATION
STATE, WE WILL BE MORE THAN GRATEFUL. CONTACTS ARE
CONTINUING.

13) BUT LIBYA HAS JUST INVADDED THE SUDAN IN
AN ATTEMPT TO OVERTHROW PRESIDENT NUMEIRY AND THE
WEEK BEFORE WAS CAUGHT PLOTTING AGAINST PRESIDENT
SADAT. WOULDN'T A CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH LIBYA BE
A SOURCE OF WORRY RATHER THAN COMFORT?

ANSWER -- NOT NECESSARILY. ANYWAY WE FEEL STRONG
ENOUGH INTERNALLY TO HAVE NORMAL RELATIONS WITH ANY
STATE.

14) QUESTION -- IF LIBYA DOESN'T AGREE, CAN YOU
ENVISAGE SAUDI ARABIA PAYING FOR SOVIET MISSILES FOR
JORDAN AFTER REFUSING TO PAY FOR U.S. ONES?

ANSWER -- THE CHOICE MUST BE LEFT TO SAUDI ARABIA.

15) QUESTION -- IS THE HAWK DEAL DEAD?
ANSWER -- AS THINGS HAVE STOOD, YES. VERY FRANKLY,
WE HAVE AN EXCELLENT OFFER THAT WE ARE CONSIDERING.
I CAN'T SEE ANY CHANGE UNLESS A COMPARABLE OR BETTER
OFFER IS FORTHCOMING. NO MORE TIME CAN BE WASTED.

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16) QUESTION -- BUT I THOUGHT A U.S. COUNTER-OFFER IN THE \$500 MILLION RANGE WAS NOW IN THE WORKS AS A RESULT OF YOUR SOVIET VISIT?

ANSWER -- WE WILL CONSIDER ANY OFFER AND MAKE OUR FINAL DECISION STRICTLY ON ITS MERITS AND ON THE BASIS OF OUR ABILITY TO FINANCE THE DEAL.

17) QUESTION -- WHAT HAS HAPPENED TO JORDANIAN TECHNICIANS WHO WERE SENT TO THE U.S. TO BEGIN TRAINING ON HAWKS AND VULCANS?

ANSWER -- THEY'RE ALL HOME AGAIN, THEIR COURSES CANCELLED.

18) QUESTION -- WAS YOUR RAPPROCHEMENT WITH SYRIA -- RATHER THAN THE \$800 MILLION PRICE TAG -- THE REASON WHY SAUDI ARABIA BACKED OUT OF THE HAWK DEAL?

ANSWER -- CERTAINLY NOT. THE COST OF THE 14 ADVANCED HAWK BATTERIES WITHOUT SPARES AND SUPPORTING INSTALLATIONS WAS \$350 MILLION. THE SAUDIS FELT THEY WERE COMMITTED TO THAT FIGURE. WE WERE NEVER SUPPOSED TO BE INVOLVED IN THE FINANCIAL END. THEN, WHEN THE U.S.'S FINAL PRICE ROSE TO \$792 MILLION FOR HAWKS AND VULCANS AND AS A RESULT OF ADDING THE NECESSARY SOFTWARE AND ALLOWING FOR INFLATION, THE SAUDIS UNDERSTANDABLY BALKED.

19) QUESTION -- RABAT SUMMIT PAYMENTS FROM THE ARAB OIL PRODUCERS TO THE THREE CONFRONTATION STATES WERE SUSPENDED AFTER THE FIRST YEAR. WHY?

ANSWER -- IT'S A FACT WE DIDN'T RECEIVE ANYTHING FOR THE SECOND YEAR AND THIS IS WHAT WE HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING WITH THE SAUDIS THIS WEEK. SINCE PAYMENTS ARE TO BE MADE BY OTHER STATES AS WELL AND SINCE WE COMMITTED OURSELVES TO CERTAIN MILITARY PURCHASES ON THE STRENGTH OF THOSE PLEDGES WE HOPE THE ASSISTANCE WILL RESUME SOON.

20) QUESTION -- WHEN DID YOU ACTUALLY BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS FOR AN ALTERNATIVE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM?

ANSWER -- IN EARLY MAY WE ASKED THE SOVIETS TO CONFIDENTIAL

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SEND A TEAM TO DISCUSS OUR NEEDS. A WEEK LATER AIR FORCE COMMANDER AND DEPUTY DEFENSE MINISTER MARSHAL PAVEL KUTAKHOV CAME TO JORDAN TO BEGIN DISCUSSIONS. AN OFFER WAS MADE IN LESS THAN A MONTH AS IN COMPARISON WITH FIVE YEARS OF FRUSTRATING ENDLESS NEGOTIATIONS WITH OUR TRADITIONAL FRIENDS.

21) QUESTION -- WILL IT BE THE WHOLE RANGE OF
SAMS -- FROM TWOS TO SEVENS?

ANSWER -- NO. THEY WILL BE THE MISSILES AND
RADAR-GUIDED ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS THAT FIT OUR SPECIFIC
REQUIREMENTS AND WHICH WE CAN HANDLE IN TERMS
OF MANPOWER CAPABILITIES. BUT THE SOVIETS PLACED NO
LIMITATION OF WHAT WE COULD PURCHASE. THE CHOICE
WAS ENTIRELY OURS.

22) QUESTION -- ARE MIG INTERCEPTORS PART OF THE
PACKAGE?

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P 110845Z JUL 76

FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8481

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 4 AMMAN 3615

LIMDIS

ANSWER--NO, NOT AS THINGS STAND NOW.

23) QUESTION -- IS IT TRUE THAT A HAWK OR SAM
SYSTEM IS ONLY EFFECTIVE FOR THE FIRST TWO OR THREE
DAYS OF A WAR BY WHICH TIME ALMOST ALL RESERVE
MISSILES WOULD HAVE BEEN FIRED?

ANSWER -- IT COULD BE, BUT WITHOUT THE
SYSTEM THE FATE OF THE BATTLE IS DECIDED IN ADVANCE.

24) QUESTION -- TO WHAT DEGREE WILL A JORDANIAN
SAM SYSTEM BE COORDINATED WITH THE SYRIAN SAM COMPLEX?

ANSWER -- TO THE SAME DGREEE AS OUR DEFENSES ARE

COORDINATED TODAY ONLY MORE EFFECTIVELY.

25) QUESTION -- ISN'T IT A LITTLE IRONIC THAT YOU TURN TO THE SOVIETS AT A TIME WHEN PRESIDENT SADAT HAS DENOUNCED SOVIET MILITARY ASSISTANCE AS AN INFRINGEMENT OF EGYPTIAN SOVEREIGNTY THROUGH THE MANIPULATION OF SUPPLIES AND SPARES?

ANSWER -- PRESIDENT SADAT IS ENTITLED TO HIS VIEWS AND ACTIONS, WE TO OURS. WE HAVE NEVER HAD ANY EXPERIENCE WITH THE SOVIETS BUT WE ALWAYS MAKE SURE THAT SUPPLIES AND SPARES ON HAND ARE ADEQUATE AND CONTROL IS STRICTLY JORDANIAN. HOWEVER, I DO
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FEEL I SHOULD SAY THAT IF IT HADN'T BEEN FOR SOVIET EQUIPMENT, EGYPT COULD NOT HAVE SUCCESSFULLY CROSSED THE CANAL IN 1973. THE OCTOBER WAR WAS ENTIRELY CONDUCTED ON BOTH FRONTS WITH SOVIET WEAPONRY. THIS CANNOT BE DENIED.

26) QUESTION -- YOU HAVE ALWAYS BEEN HIGHLY SUSPICIOUS OF SOVIET DESIGNS IN THE MIDEAST. WHAT HAS CHANGED YOUR MIND?

ANSWER -- NOTHING HAS CHANGED MY VIEWS ON THE INTERESTS OF THE TWO SUPERPOWERS AND THEIR ATTEMPTS TO CONTROL EVENTS IN THE AREA. WE STAND FOR THE BEST POSSIBLE RELATIONS WITH ALL SIDES AND ARE OPEN TO, AND HOPE TO BENEFIT FROM, EXPERIENCES THE WORLD OVER. BUT THERE CAN BE NO COMPROMISES WITH OUR OWN DISTINCTIVE IDENTITY.

27) WHAT IS YOUR EXPLANATION FOR THE SEEMINGLY ENDLESS AND SENSELESS BLOODSHED IN LEBANON NOW IN ITS 16TH MONTH?

ANSWER -- FIRST, A SERIOUS INTERNAL LEBANESE PROBLEM THAT COULD HAVE BEEN RESOLVED BY THE LEBANESE THEMSELVES IF THE PLO HAD KEPT OUT OF IT. SECOND, ARAB DIVISIONS THAT USED LEBANON AS THE BATTLEGROUND. THIRD, AN UNFORGIVEABLE ERROR OF JUDGMENT BY THE PLO LEADERSHIP THAT HAS CAUSED THOUSANDS OF PALESTINIANS TO BE INVOLVED IN AN ARMED STRUGGLE ON NON-PALESTINIAN TERRITORY IN A CAUSE THAT IS NOT A PALESTINIAN ONE AND IN OTHER THAN PALESTINIAN AND ARAB INTERESTS.

28) QUESTION -- WHAT ARE YOUR REASONS FOR BACKING SYRIAN INTERVENTION IN LEBANON WITHOUT ANY RESERVATIONS?

ANSWER -- MY CONVICTION THAT SYRIA'S SOLE OBJECTIVE IS TO RESTORE PEACE AND RESOLVE THE CONFLICT IN A MEANINGFUL, PEACEFUL DIALOGUE, TO SAVE LEBANON'S INTEGRITY AND AVOID PARTITION, SAFEGUARDING THE RIGHTS OF ALL LEBANESE. GEOGRAPHICALLY AND PHYSICALLY, ONLY

SYRIA COULD PUT AN END TO THE FIGHTING.

29) QUESTION -- DO YOU FEEL THE SOVIETS, AFTER
LISTENING TO YOUR EXPLANATION, ARE NOW LESS OPPOSED TO
SYRIAN INTERVENTION?

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ANSWER -- THEY HAVE OPEN CHANNELS TO DAMASCUS.
MY EFFORTS MERELY SUPPLEMENTED SYRIA'S. IT'S UP TO
MOSCOW TO JUDGE THE MERITS OF THE CASE.

30) QUESTION -- HOW DO YOU THINK THE LEBANESE CIVIL WAR
AFFECTS THE ARAB-ISRAELI EQUATION?

ANSWER -- IN DISASTROUS WAY. WE HAVE MORE
DIVISIONS IN THE ARAB WORLD TODAY THAN EVER BEFORE.
THE PLO HAS WEAKENED, PERHAPS IRREPARABLY, ITS
ARGUMENT THAT JEWS, MOSLEMS AND CHRISTIANS COULD
LIVE IN HARMONY SIDE BY SIDE IN A FUTURE GREATER
PALESTINE WHEN IT IS SEEN THAT ARABS THEMSELVES,
CITIZENS OF THE SAME COUNTRY, NOT ONLY CANNOT COEXIST
BUT COLLIDE DAY AND NIGHT. THEY HAVE PLAYED ISRAEL'S
GAME AND DIVERTED ATTENTION FROM THE AREA'S MAJOR
PROBLEM-- ISRAEL'S WITHDRAWAL TO THE PRE-1967 WAR
FRONTIERS AND THE RECOGNITION OF PALESTINAIAN RIGHTS
ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.

31) QUESTION --IF THERE IS NO MIDEAST
SETTLEMENT WITHOUT THE PLO AND APPARENTLY NO SETTLEMENT
WITH THE PLO EITHER, WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

ANSWER -- I BELIEVE THAT REGARDLESS OF ITS
SHOCKING PERFORMANCE IN LEBANON, THE PLO CONCEPT IS A
SOUND ONE. PLO LEADERSHIP WILL HAVE TO MEND ITS WAYS
AND THEN IF EFFORTS FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION ARE
RESUMED, A REJUVENATED AND WIDER PLO MUST BE
INVOLVED IN THE DIPLOMATIC PROCESS.

32) QUESTION -- DOESN'T JORDAN STILL HOLD THE
KEY TO A PALESTINIAN SETTLEMENT -- RABAT DECISIONS
NOTWITHSTANDING?

ANSWER -- NO, JORDAN DOES NOT. WE BELIEVE VERY
STRONGLY THIS CAN ONLY BE DONE BY THE PALESTINIAN
LEADERSHIP. JORDAN COULD HAVE HAD A DIFFERENT POSITION
IF ISRAEL HAD PLAYED ITS HAND DIFFERENTLY PRIOR TO
RABAT. NOW ISRAEL HAS CHANGED THE EQUATION AND JORDAN
IS OUT OF IT.

33) THEN YOU ARE NOT INTERESTED IN TAKING PART
IN A REVISED GENEVA CONFERENCE THAT KISSINGER IS
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TALKING ABOUT AGAIN?

ANSWER -- JORDAN MAY PARTICIPATE AS ONE OF THE
THREE ARAB CONFRONTATION STATES TO SUPPORT AND NOT
TO SPEAK FOR THE PALESTINIANS. THAT MUST BE DONE BY
THE PALESTINIANS THEMSELVES.

34) QUESTION -- IN THE LIGHT OF RECENT RIOTS
ON THE WEST BANK, ALONG WITH THE RESULTS OF LOCAL
ELECTIONS AND YOUR OWN CONTACTS WITH WEST BANKERS
UNDER ISRAELI OCCUPATION, WHAT DO YOU FEEL THE
PALESTINIANS LIVING THERE REALLY WANT?
ANSWER -- AN END TO THE OCCUPATION AND TO BE
LEFT ALONE TO ESTABLISH THEIR OWN RIGHTS ON THEIR
LAND. LOCAL ELECTIONS, WHICH EXCLUDED EAST JERUSALEM
AND WERE HELD UNDER ISRAELI LAW, DID NEVERTHELESS

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P 110845Z JUL 76

FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8482

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 4 OF 4 AMMAN 3615

LIMDIS

BRING FORTH A NEW PALESTINIAN LEADERSHIP.
ONLY TIME AND FUTURE PLO ACTIONS WILL TELL WHETHER
IT'S PRO-PLO OR OTHERWISE.

35) QUESTION -- WITH EGYPT OUT OF THE MILITARY

EQUATION BECAUSE OF BAD BLOOD WITH THE SOVIET UNION, WITH SYRIA BOGGED DOWN IN LEBANON AND OBVIOUSLY INCAPABLE OF RESUMING WAR WITH ISRAEL, AND WITH JORDAN MILITARILY WEAK AND ENJOYING UNPRECEDENTED PROSPERITY, ISRAELI LEADERS FEEL THERE IS NO COMPELLING REASON TO MOVE AND ARE EVEN PREDICTING THAT A NEW US ADMINISTRATION WILL COME TO THE SAME CONCLUSION. WHAT DO YOU THINK WILL CHANGE THESE PERCEPTIONS? ANSWER -- I BELIEVE THEY ARE DANGEROUSLY COMPLACENT. WE WILL SEE A RAPID DETERIORATION TOWARD ANOTHER EXPLOSION UNLESS THE MOMENTUM TOWARD PEACE IS RESUMED. THE PRE-OCTOBER WAR DANGER HAS BEEN REVIVED, BECUASE AS THE ARABS BEGIN ONCE AGAIN TO ABANDON HOPE OF REGAINING THEIR CONQUERED LANDS THROUGH DIPLOMACY, ANOTHER "INTERIM" WAR WILL LOOM LARGER AND LARGER, REGARDLESS OF HOW THE MILITARY BALANCE LIES.

36) QUESTION -- SOME ISRAELI LEADERS SEEM
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CONVINCED THAT SYRIA WILL SOON BE READY FOR ANOTHER GOLAN AGREEMENT -- THE REBUILDING OF KUNEITRA, AS SUEZ CANAL CITIES WERE REBUILT, AND THE RETURN OF 60,000 SYRIAN REFUGEES TO THE AREA, ALL IN EXCHANGE FOR AN ISRAELI AGREEMENT TO DISMANTLE SOME OF ITS SETTLEMENTS ON GOLAN AND PULL BACK PART WAY TO THE 67 BORDER. GIVEN SYRIA'S BITTER DENUNCIATIONS OF A SEPARATE SINAI AGREEMENT LAST SEPTEMBER, DOES THIS MAKE SENSE TO YOU?

ANSWER -- IT DOES NOT. I FEEL QUITE SURE THAT WHAT WE WILL SEE IS GROWING PRESSURE ON ALL FRONTS FOR TOTAL WITHDRAWAL TO THE 67 FRONTIERS IN RETURN FOR AN END TO THE STATE OF WAR. THAT IS THE ARAB OBJECTIVE AND THE PEACE THAT WOULD FOLLOW WOULD BE A REAL PEACE. WE MUST NOW COME UP WITH AN OVERALL PERCEPTION OF THE FINAL SOLUTION AND AN AGREED TIME SPAN FOR ITS IMPLEMENTATION. SHORT OF KNOWING WHAT THIS IS GOING TO BE, NO FURTHER INTERIM SETTLEMENTS WILL BE POSSIBLE.

37) JIMMY CARTER, WHO HAS A BETTER THAN EVEN CHANCE OF BEING THE NEXT US PRESIDENT, SAYS THAT THE ARABS, IN RETURN FOR THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, WOULD HAVE TO GRANT ISRAEL A FINAL PEACE TREATY, DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, OPEN FRONTIERS AND AN END TO HOSTILE PROPAGANDA. WOULD YOU HAVE ANY OBJECTIONS? ANSWER -- SUCH A PACKAGE HAS ONE ESSENTIAL FLAW -- A SOLUTION TO THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM, RECOGNIZING PALESTINIAN RIGHTS AND ON PALESTINIAN

SOIL OCCUPIED IN JUNE 1967 TOGETHER WITH THEIR
INALIANABLE RIGHT OF SELF DETERMINATION. WITHOUT
THAT, YOU HAVE NOTHING. WITH IT, ANYTHING BECOMES
POSSIBLE.
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Message Attributes

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